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Crime Victims’ Rights 
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Over the last 40 years, advocates for crime victims have succeeded in enshrining 
victims’ rights in state constitutions and other enactments. These provisions show 
that a consensus has developed around the country on certain core victims’ rights. 
Included in the core are, among other things, the right to notice of court hearings, 
to attend court hearings, to be heard at appropriate court hearings, to 
proceedings free from unreasonable delay, to consideration of the victims’ safety 
during the process, and to restitution. The current challenge for the country is 
ensuring that these core rights are fully and effectively implemented and that 
victims have a means for enforcing these rights. Strengthened enforcement 
language in state constitutions and, ultimately, perhaps placing victims’ rights in 
the United States Constitution offer the best prospects for fully protecting crime 
victims’ interests in the criminal justice system. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The other chapters in this volume on criminal justice reform have largely focused on 
prosecutors’ interests in bringing criminals to justice or defendants’ (or potential defendants’) 
interests in protecting their personal privacy or receiving due process. But no discussion of 
criminal justice would be complete without considering the interests of an important group: 
crime victims. Crime victims have compelling concerns in the criminal justice system. No 
system of criminal justice can gain broad community acceptance if it fails to attend appropriately 
to victims’ interests. 
Over the last 40 years, acting on a bipartisan basis, the vast majority of states have adopted 
significant statutory and even constitutional protections for crime victims. These enactments rest 
on the widely shared premise that “[w]hile defendants have strong interests in fair trials, victims 
likewise have strong personal interests in being listened to and taken seriously.”1 This chapter 
looks carefully at the federal and state crime victims’ rights protections that have become an 
important—but often underappreciated—part of the current architecture in American criminal 
justice. While these protections differ in detail from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, when examined 
as a group, many common features emerge.  
The goal of this chapter is to attempt to distill from these enactments a core set of shared 
values for victims’ rights in these American provisions.2 This chapter begins by briefly 
discussing the history of the crime victims’ rights movement over the last several decades. It then 
reviews crime victims’ enactments to identify the core set of values that have emerged. It finally 
                                                
1 STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 91 (2012).  
2 Similar shared values about the importance of victims’ rights exist in foreign and international law as well, but are 
beyond the scope of this short chapter. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, MIXED RESULTS: U.S. POLICY AND 
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON THE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OF VICTIMS OF CRIME (2008), 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/09/23/mixed-results/us-policy-and-international-standards-rights-and-interests-
victims (discussing the many “international human rights instruments [that] address or touch on [crime] victims’ 
rights”); cf. Marie Manikis, Imagining the Future of Victims’ Rights in Canada: A Comparative Perspective, 13 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 163 (2015); Michael K. Browne, International Victims’ Rights Law: What Can Be Gleaned 
from the Victims’ Empowerment Procedures in Germany as the United States Prepares to Consider the Adoption of 
a “Victim’s Rights Amendment” to its Constitution, 27 HAMLINE L. REV. 15 (2004) (discussing German victims’ 
law).  
offers some thoughts about what appears to be the most pressing current challenge for crime 
victims’ rights: the need for effective enforcement. This chapter concludes that strengthened state 
constitutional amendments—and perhaps even a federal constitutional amendment protecting 
crime victims’ rights—offer the best path for ensuring that crime victims’ interests are properly 
protected in our criminal justice process. 3 
 
I. THE CRIME VICTIMS’ RIGHTS MOVEMENT 
While a comprehensive history of the treatment of crime victims in the system remains to be 
written, the broad outlines can be quickly sketched. At our country’s founding, crime victims 
played an important role in criminal prosecutions, often bringing their own “private” 
prosecutions.4 Over time through the 19th century, however, a system of public prosecution 
steadily displaced victims.5 Ultimately, well into the 20th century, the system had moved to the 
point where it seemed fair to describe the victim as “the forgotten man” of the system.6 
 The Crime Victims’ Rights Movement developed in the 1970s because of this perceived 
imbalance. The victim’s absence from criminal processes conflicted with “a public sense of 
justice keen enough that it … found voice in a nationwide ‘victims’ rights’ movement.”7 Victims’ 
advocates argued that the criminal justice system had become preoccupied with defendants’ 
rights to the exclusion of considering the legitimate interests of crime victims.8 These advocates 
urged reforms to give more attention to victims’ concerns, including protecting victims’ rights to 
be notified of court hearings, to attend those hearings, and to be heard at appropriate points in the 
process.9 The victims’ rights movement brought together a broad and diverse coalition, including 
women’s rights advocates concerned about the treatment of rape victims in court proceedings, 
advocates for racial minorities concerned about inadequate protection against racially motivated 
violence, and “law and order” advocates concerned that victims’ interests were given inadequate 
attention by judges focused on defendants’ rights. 
                                                
3 This chapter draws on some of my earlier articles discussing victims’ rights. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, The 
Victims’ Rights Amendment: A Sympathetic, Clause-by-Clause Analysis, 5 PHOENIX L. REV. 301 (2012); Paul G. 
Cassell, Protecting Crime Victims in Federal Appellate Courts: The Need to Broadly Construe the Crime Victims’ 
Rights Act’s Mandamus Provision, 87 DENV. U.L. REV. 599 (2010); Paul G. Cassell & Steven Joffee, The Crime 
Victim’s Expanding Role in a System of Public Prosecution: A Response to the Critics of the Crime Victims’ Rights 
Act, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 164 (2010); Paul G. Cassell, Treating Crime Victims Fairly: Integrating 
Victims into the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 861. 
4 William F. McDonald, Towards a Bicentennial Revolution in Criminal Justice: The Return of the Victim, 13 AM. 
CRIM. L REV. 649 (1976).  
5 BIBAS, supra note 1, at 88; Abraham Goldstein, Defining the Role of the Victim in Criminal Prosecution, 52 MISS. 
L.J. 1 (1982); Douglas E. Beloof, Weighing Crime Victims’ Interests in Judicially Crafted Criminal Procedure, 56 
CATH. U.L. REV. 1135, 1138-42 (2007). 
6 McDonald, supra note 4, at 650.  
7 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 834 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal quotations omitted). See generally 
DOUGLAS EVEN BELOOF, PAUL G. CASSELL & STEVEN J. TWIST, VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 3-35 (3d ed. 
2010); Douglas Evan Beloof, The Third Model of Criminal Process: The Victim Participation Model, 1999 UTAH L. 
REV. 289; Paul G. Cassell, Balancing the Scales of Justice: The Case for and Effects of Utah’s Victims’ Rights 
Amendment, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1373 [hereinafter Cassell, Balancing the Scales]; Goldstein, supra note 5; William 
T. Pizzi & Walter Perron, Crime Victims in German Courtrooms: A Comparative Perspective on American 
Problems, 32 STAN. J. INT’L L. 37 (1996); Collene Campbell et al., Appendix: The Victims’ Voice, 5 PHOENIX L. 
REV. 379 (2012). 
8 See generally BELOOF, CASSELL & TWIST, supra note 7, at 29-38; Douglas E. Beloof, The Third Wave of Victims’ 
Rights: Standing, Remedy, and Review, 2005 BYU L. REV. 255; Cassell, Balancing the Scales of Justice, supra note 
7, at 1380-82. 
9 See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Redefining Roles: The Victims’ Rights Movement, 1985 UTAH L. REV. 517. 
The victims’ rights movement received considerable impetus in 1982 when the President’s 
Task Force on Victims of Crime reviewed the treatment of victims.10 In a report issued that year, 
the task force concluded that the criminal justice system “has lost an essential balance. … [T]he 
system has deprived the innocent, the honest, and the helpless of its protection. … The victims of 
crime have been transformed into a group oppressively burdened by a system designed to protect 
them. This oppression must be redressed.”11 The task force advocated multiple reforms, such as 
prosecutors assuming the responsibility for keeping victims notified of all court proceedings and 
bringing to the court’s attention the victim’s view on such subjects as bail, plea bargains, 
sentences, and restitution.12 The task force also urged that courts should receive victim-impact 
evidence at sentencing, order restitution in most cases, and allow victims and their families to 
attend trials even if they would be called as witnesses.13 In its most sweeping recommendation, 
the task force proposed a federal constitutional amendment to protect crime victims’ rights “to be 
present and to be heard at all critical stages of judicial proceedings.”14 
In the wake of the recommendation for a federal constitutional amendment, crime victims’ 
advocates considered how best to pursue that goal. Realizing the difficulty of achieving the 
consensus required to amend the United States Constitution, advocates decided to try to initially 
enact state victims’ amendments. They have had considerable success with this “states first” 
strategy.15 To date, about 35 states have adopted victims’ rights amendments to their own state 
constitutions protecting a wide range of victims’ rights. 
The state constitutional amendments were passed in two waves. Beginning with Rhode 
Island’s enactment of a statement amendment in 198616 and Michigan’s in 1988,17 more than 30 
states passed the state constitutional amendments in what might be regarded as the first wave of 
protection of crime victims’ rights. The amendments provided a broad range of crime victims’ 
rights in the criminal justice process. And even in states without constitutional protection, 
statutory protections for victims’ rights were enacted. In many states, however, the amendments 
and statutes lacked effective enforcement mechanisms to ensure that their rights were fully 
implemented. As Attorney General Janet Reno explained in 1997 after a Justice Department 
review of the landscape, these state efforts “failed to fully safeguard victims’ rights.”18 
One way of improving enforcement of state crime victims’ rights enactments is through 
strengthened state constitutional protections. In 2008, a second wave of state constitutional 
efforts began. In California, Dr. Henry T. Nicholas (the co-founder of Broadcom Corp.) backed 
the enactment of “Marsy’s Law,” named after his sister Marsalee (Marsy) Nicholas. She was 
stalked and killed by her ex-boyfriend in 1983. Only a week after her murder, Dr. Nicholas and 
Marsy’s mother walked into a grocery store after visiting Marsy’s grave and were confronted by 
                                                
10 PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT (1982), available at  
https://www.ovc.gov/publications/presdntstskforcrprt/welcome.html.  
11 Id. at 114. 
12 Id. at 63. 
13 Id. at 72-73. 
14 Id. at 114 (emphasis omitted). 
15 See S. REP. NO. 108-191 (2003). 
16 RHODE ISLAND CONST. art. I, § 23.  
17 MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24 
18 A Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Protect Victims of Crime: Hearing on S.J. Res. 6 Before the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 64 (1997) (statement of Janet Reno, U.S. Att’y Gen.). 
the accused murderer. The family had not been told that he had been released on bail.19 The 
family also suffered further indignities during the criminal justice process. 
Determined to prevent mistreatment of other victims in the process, Dr. Nicholas supported 
a comprehensive rewrite of California’s state constitutional amendment protecting crime victims. 
In November 2008, California voters overwhelming approved Proposition 9,20 making 
California’s amendment arguably the strongest and most comprehensive in the country. Since 
then, similar Marsy’s Law amendments have been added to the state constitutions of Illinois in 
2014,21 and Montana, North Dakota, and South Dakota in 2016.22 Efforts are currently underway 
to add enhanced state constitutional protections for victims in Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky Maine, 
Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin, among other states.23 
 
II. CORE CRIME VICTIMS’ RIGHTS 
The enactment of state crime victims’ rights amendments across the country suggests, when 
viewed together, an emerging consensus that certain core victims’ rights should be protected. 
This section briefly reviews a number of these core rights,24 making the case for each of them 
and then explaining how protection has been operationalized in the current state constitutional 
(and, in some cases, statutory) enactments. 
 
A. THE RIGHT TO NOTICE OF COURT HEARINGS 
A crime victim’s right to notice about criminal proceedings is an important right that is now 
broadly recognized. Because victims and their families are directly and often irreparably harmed 
by crime, they have a vital interest in knowing about any subsequent prosecution and any 
associated hearings. Notice of court hearings is traditionally recognized as a core part of due 
process.25 While victims may not suffer a loss of liberty as the result of a criminal proceeding, 
they certainly have strong claim to be kept fully informed about the progress of a criminal case. 
Knowing what is happening can, for example, greatly reduce a victim’s anxiety about the 
process.26 For reasons such as these, the President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime urged that 
“[p]rosecutors should keep victims informed about the status of the case from the initial decision 
to charge or to decline prosecution.”27  
To guarantee that victims will be kept informed about the progress of court cases, many state 
constitutional and statutory provisions promise crime victims that they will be notified about 
court hearings. The California Constitution, for example, guarantees crime victims “reasonable 
notice” of all public proceedings.28 The Idaho Constitution guarantees the right “to prior 
                                                
19 See About Marsy’s Law, MARSY’S LAW FOR ALL, https://marsyslaw.us/about-marsys-law/.  
20 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28. 
21 ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1. 
22 Respectively, MONT. CONST. art. II, § 36; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 25; and S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 29. 
23 See About Marsy’s Law, supra note 19. 
24 In this brief chapter, I don’t discuss every right that might be considered “core” or important to victims.  
25 See, e.g., Dusenberg v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167 (2002).  
26 PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE, , supra note 10, at 64 (quoting victim to this effect).  
27 Id. Cf. Ronald F. Wright, “Prosecutor Institutions and Incentives,” in the present Report (suggestion declaration of 
standards for prosecutors, standards which could include crime victims’ rights protections).   
28 CAL. CONST., art. I, § 28(b)(7). 
notification of trial court, appellate and parole proceeding.”29 And the Texas Constitution 
promises “the right to notification of court proceedings … on the request of a crime victim.”30 
Some state provisions spell out notifications in more detail. For example, my own state of 
Utah has enacted the Utah Rights of Crime Victims Act, which provides that “[w]ithin seven 
days of the filing of felony criminal charges against a defendant, the prosecuting agency shall 
provide an initial notice to reasonably identifiable and locatable victims of the crime contained in 
the charges.”31 The initial notice must contain information about “electing to receive notice of 
subsequent important criminal justice hearings.”32 In practice, Utah prosecuting agencies have 
provided these notices with a detachable postcard or, more recently, a computer-generated letter 
that victims simply return to the prosecutor’s office to receive subsequent notices about 
proceedings. The return letter serves as the victims’ request for further notices. In the absence of 
such a request, a prosecutor need not send any further notices.33  
Fortunately, with developing new electronic technologies, keeping victims informed about 
court hearings is becoming easier than ever.34 Automated victim-notification systems abound, 
most prominently the so-called VINE (Victim Information Notification Everyday) system.35 
Under such a system, a victim registers for notification through e-mail or phone call. Then, when 
court hearings are scheduled, a computerized notification is made. 
In some cases (e.g., terrorist bombings or massive financial frauds), the large number of 
victims may render individual notifications impractical. In such circumstances, notice by means 
of a press release to daily newspapers in the area has been regarded as a reasonable alternative to 
actual notice sent to each victim at his or her residential address.36 New technologies may also 
provide a way of affording reasonable notice. For example, some federal courts have approved 
notice by publication, where the publication directs crime victims to a website maintained by the 
government with hyperlinks to updates on the case.37 
 
B. THE RIGHT TO ATTEND COURT HEARINGS 
Victims also deserve the right to attend all public proceedings related to a crime, as is 
recognized across the country. The President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime articulated the 
basis for this right: “The crime is often one of the most significant events in the lives of victims 
and their families. They, no less than the defendant, have a legitimate interest in the fair 
adjudication of the case, and should therefore, as an exception to the general rule providing for 
the exclusion of witnesses, be permitted to be present for the entire trial.”38 
                                                
29 IDAHO CONST., art. I, § 22(3). See Note, Victim’s Rights Amendments: An Irresistible Political Force Transforms 
the Criminal Justice System, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 157, 184-86 (1997) (discussing enforcement of notification 
provisions). 
30 TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30 (order rearranged). 
31 UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38-3(1). See generally Cassell, Balancing the Scales, supra note 7. 
32 Id. § 77-38-3(2). The notice will also contain information about other rights under the victims’ statute. Id. 
33 Id. § 77-38-3(8); see also Steven J. Twist & Keelah E.G. Williams, Twenty-Five Years of Victims’ Rights in 
Arizona, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 421, 434 (2015) (discussing victim notification in Arizona).  
34 See BIBAS, supra note 1, at 150 (“With the advent of email, notifying victims . . . is even easier”).  
35 See, e.g., VINE, APPRISS SAFETY, https://apprisssafety.com/solutions/vine/.  
36 United States v. Peralta, No. 3:08cr233, 2009 WL 2998050, at *1-2 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 15, 2009). 
37 See, e.g., United States v. Skilling, No. H-04-025-SS, 2009 WL 806757, at *1-2 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2009); 
United States v. Saltsman, No. 07-CR-641 (NGG), 2007 WL 4232985, at *1-2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2007); United 
States v. Croteau, No. 05-CR-30104-DRH, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23684, at *2-3 (S.D. Ill. 2006). 
38 PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE, supra note 10, at 80. 
Several strong reasons support such a right. As Professor Doug Beloof and I have argued at 
length elsewhere,39 the right to attend the trial may be critical in allowing the victim to recover 
from the psychological damage of a crime. And it is widely recognized that the “victim’s 
presence during the trial may also facilitate healing of the debilitating psychological wounds 
suffered by a crime victim.”40 
Concern about psychological trauma becomes even more pronounced when coupled with 
findings that defense attorneys have, in some cases, improperly used broad witness-exclusion 
rules to harm victims.41 Moreover, without a right to attend the trial, “the criminal justice system 
merely intensifies the loss of control that victims feel after the crime.”42 It should come as no 
surprise that “[v]ictims are often appalled to learn that they may not be allowed to sit in the 
courtroom during hearings or the trial. They are unable to understand why they cannot simply 
observe the proceedings in a supposedly public forum.”43 One crime victim put it more directly: 
“All we ask is that we be treated just like a criminal.”44 Defendants take full advantage of their 
right to be in the courtroom.45 
To ensure that victims can attend court proceedings, many state amendments extend to a 
crime victim an unqualified right to attend trial,46 while others extend a qualified right to attend 
unless the victim’s testimony would be materially affected by attendance.47 Typically such 
provisions give victims a right not to be excluded from public proceedings. The right is phrased 
in the negative—a right not to be excluded—thus avoiding the possible suggestion that a right 
“to attend” carried with it a victim’s right to demand payment from the government for travel to 
court.48 Such an unqualified right does not interfere with a defendant’s right for the simple reason 
that defendants have no constitutional right to exclude victims from the courtroom.49 
The victim’s right not to be excluded is limited to public proceedings. While the great bulk 
of court proceedings are public, occasionally they must be closed for various compelling reasons. 
                                                
39 See Douglas E. Beloof & Paul G. Cassell, The Crime Victim’s Right to Attend the Trial: The Reascendant 
National Consensus, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 481 (2005). 
40 Ken Eikenberry, Victims of Crimes/Victims of Justice, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 29, 41 (1987). 
41 See generally OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE CRIME VICTIM’S RIGHT TO BE PRESENT 
2 (2001) (showing how defense counsel can successfully argue to have victims excluded as witnesses). 
42 Deborah P. Kelly, Victims, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 69, 72 (1987). 
43 Marlene A. Young, A Constitutional Amendment for Victims of Crime: The Victims’ Perspective, 34 WAYNE L. 
REV. 51, 58 (1987). 
44 Id. at 59 (quoting Edmund Newton, Criminals Have All the Rights, LADIES’ HOME J., Sept. 1986). 
45 See LINDA E. LEDRAY, RECOVERING FROM RAPE 199 (2d ed. 1994) (“Even the most disheveled [rapist] will turn 
up in court clean-shaven, with a haircut, and often wearing a suit and tie. He will not appear to be the type of man 
who could rape.”). 
46 See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24 (right “to be present at all criminal ... proceedings where the accused has the 
right to be present”); MICH. CONST., art. I, § 24(1) (right “to attend the trial and all other court proceedings the 
accused has the right to attend”); OR. R. EVID. 615 (witness exclusion rule does not apply to “victim in a criminal 
case”); see also Beloof & Cassell, supra note 39, at 504-19 (providing a comprehensive discussion of state law on 
this subject). 
47 See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b) (“Victims of crime or their lawful representatives ... are entitled to the right ... 
to be present ... at all crucial stages of criminal proceedings, to the extent that these rights do not interfere with the 
constitutional rights of the accused”).  
48 Cf. ALA. CODE § 15-14-54 (right “not [to] be excluded from court ... during the trial or hearing or any portion 
thereof ... which in any way pertains to such offense”).  This negative formulation may be excessive caution, 
because no right-to-be-present provision has been interpreted to require the State to pay for victims to travel. 
49 See Beloof & Cassell, supra note 39, at 520-34; see, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 526 F.3d 747, 757-58 (11th 
Cir. 2008). 
Generally the way that state amendments work is not to interfere with court closure policies, but 
simply to indicate that when a proceeding is closed, the victim may be excluded as well.50 
 
C. THE RIGHT TO BE HEARD AT RELEVANT PROCEEDINGS 
Many states have also properly recognized that crime victims deserve the right to be heard at 
appropriate points in the criminal justice process, thus allowing victims to participate directly in 
criminal proceedings. Allowing such victim participation can provide important information to 
judges. Having the actual victim speak is useful because “gauging the harm to a unique human 
being, not a faceless abstraction, requires evidence of how that particular victim suffered.”51 And 
victim participation can lead to important therapeutic benefits. As Professor Bibas has explained 
at length in his important book The Machinery of Criminal Justice, “it is simple participation that 
helps to empower and heal victims. Participants see the law as more fair and legitimate when 
they have some control over the process and they have been heard, whether or not they control 
ultimate outcomes.”52 Hearing victim voices can be important regardless of any formal effect on 
criminal penalties, as recent experience with “reconciliation commissions” in other countries 
attests.53 
Recognizing such benefits, states have extended a right to participate in various ways. For 
example, the recently enacted constitutional provision in South Dakota promises crime victims 
the “the right to be heard in any proceeding involving release, plea, sentencing, adjudication, 
disposition or parole, and any proceeding during which a right of the victim is implicated.”54 A 
number of states have added similar provisions to their state constitutions guaranteeing victim 
participation.55 
The existing state amendments frequently recognize several points in the process as 
appropriate times for crime victims to be heard. First, the amendments commonly extend the 
right to be heard regarding any release proceeding—i.e., bail hearings. This right allows, for 
example, a victim of domestic violence to warn the court about possible violence should the 
defendant be granted bail. At the same time, however, nothing in these rights gives victims the 
ability to veto the release of any defendant. The ultimate decision to hold or release a defendant 
remains with the judge. The victim’s right to be heard regarding bail simply provides the judge 
with more information on which to base that decision. Release proceedings typically include not 
                                                
50 See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET. AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 23.1(b) (3d ed. 2007) (discussing court closure 
cases). 
51 BIBAS, supra note 1, at 91; see also Laurence H. Tribe, McVeigh’s Victims Had a Right to Speak, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 9, 1997, at A25.  
52 BIBAS, supra note 1, at 151.  
53 See, e.g., Mary Burton, Custodians of Memory: South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission 32 INT’L J. 
LEGAL INFO. 417 (2004).  
54 S.D. CONST. art VI, § 29. 
55 See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art II, § 2.1(A)(4) (right to be heard at proceedings involving post-arrest release, 
negotiated pleas, and sentencing); COLO. CONST. art. II, § 16a (right to be heard at critical stages); FLA. CONST. art. 
I, § 16(b) (right to be heard when relevant at all stages); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1(4) (right to make statement at 
sentencing); KAN. CONST. art. 15, § 15(a) (right to be heard at sentencing or any other appropriate time); MICH. 
CONST. art. I, § 24(1) (right to make statement at sentencing); MO. CONST. art. I, § 32(1)(2) (right to be heard at 
guilty pleas, bail hearings, sentencings, probation revocation hearings, and parole hearings, unless interests of justice 
require otherwise); N.M. CONST. art. II, § 24(A)(7) (right to make statement at sentencing and post-sentencing 
hearings); R.I. CONST. art. I, § 23 (right to address court at sentencing); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 35 (right to make 
statement at sentencing or release proceeding); WIS. CONST. art. I, § 9m (opportunity to make statement to court at 
disposition); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 28(1)(b) (right to be heard at important proceedings).  
only bail hearings but other hearings involving the release of accused or convicted offenders, 
such as parole hearings. Victim statements to parole boards are particularly important because 
they “can enable the board to fully appreciate the nature of the offense and the degree to which 
the particular inmate may present risks to the victim or community upon release.”56 
The right to be heard also typically extends to any proceeding involving a plea bargain. 
Under the present rules of procedure in most states, a plea bargain between the prosecution and a 
defendant must be submitted to the trial judge for approval.57 If the judge believes that the 
bargain is not in the interests of justice, she may reject it.58 Unfortunately in some states, a victim 
does not always have the opportunity to discuss a plea with the prosecution while it is being 
negotiated59 or to present to the judge information about whether to approve the plea. Indeed, it 
may be that in some cases, “keeping the victim away from the judge … is one of the prime 
motivations for plea bargaining.”60 Yet victims have compelling reasons for some role in the plea 
bargaining process: 
The victim’s interests in participating in the plea bargaining process are many. 
The fact that they are consulted and listened to provide them with respect and an 
acknowledgment that they are the harmed individual. This in turn may contribute 
to the psychological healing of the victim. The victim may have financial interests 
in the form of restitution or compensatory fine. … [B]ecause judges act in the 
public interest when they decide to accept or reject a plea bargain, the victim is an 
additional source of information for the court.61 
As with the right to be heard regarding bail, victims have a voice in the plea bargaining 
process, not a veto. The judge is not required to follow the victim’s suggested course of action on 
the plea, but simply has more information on which to base such a determination. 
State amendments typically extend to victims the right to be heard at proceedings for 
determining a sentence. Defendants, of course, have the right to directly address the sentencing 
                                                
56 Frances P. Bernat et al., Victim Impact Laws and the Parole Process in the United States: Balancing Victim and 
Inmate Rights and Interests, 3 INT’L REV. VICTIMOLOGY 121, 134 (1994); see also Laura L. Richardson, The Impact 
of Marsy’s Law on Parole in California, 49 CRIM. L. BULL. 1091 (2013) (discussing changes in parole hearings after 
Marsy’s law enactment); Kathryne M. Young, Parole Hearings and Victims’ Rights: Implementation, Ambiguity, 
and Reform, 49 CONN. L. REV. 431 (2016).  
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authority before sentence is imposed.62 Victims’ enactments typically extend the same basic right 
to victims.63 
Elsewhere, I have argued at length in favor of such victim-impact statements.64 The essential 
rationales are that victim-impact statements provide information to the sentencer, have 
therapeutic and other benefits for victims, explain the crime’s harm to the defendant, and 
improve the perceived fairness of sentencing.65 The arguments in favor of victim-impact 
statements have been generally persuasive in this country, as the federal system and all 50 states 
provide victims the opportunity to deliver a victim-impact statement.66 It is important to 
emphasize that victims “are not reflexively punitive” and a number of “[e]mpirical studies find 
that participation by victims does not lead to harsher sentences.”67 Nor does the claim that 
victims’ impact statements might be somehow “emotional” carry much weight, given that many 
other parts of the law recognize that it is proper to have such arguments.68  
Victims can exercise their right to be heard in any appropriate fashion, including making an 
oral statement at court proceedings or submitting written information for the court’s 
consideration. Defendants can respond to the information that victims provide in appropriate 
ways, such as providing counter-information.69 
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Finally, many state amendments extend to a victim a general right to be heard at any 
proceeding involving any right established by the amendment. This allows victims to present 
information in support of a claim of right under the amendments, consistent with normal due-
process principles.70 
 
D. THE RIGHT TO PROCEEDINGS FREE FROM UNREASONABLE DELAY 
Many state provisions also extend to crime victims the right to “a speedy trial and a prompt 
and final conclusion of the case”71 or to proceedings “free from unreasonable delay.”72 Such 
provisions are designed to be the victim’s analogue to a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a 
speedy trial.73 The defendant’s right is designed, among other things, “to minimize anxiety and 
concern accompanying public accusation” and “to limit the possibilities that long delay will 
impair the ability of an accused to defend himself.”74 The interests underlying a speedy trial, 
however, are not confined to defendants. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that “there is a 
societal interest in providing a speedy trial which exists separate from, and at times in opposition 
to, the interests of the accused.”75 
Victims often suffer significantly from delays in the criminal justice system.76 For example, 
victims of violent crime frequently suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).77 A 
connection between initial victimization and later depression, substance abuse, panic disorder, 
agoraphobia, social phobia, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and even suicide has also been 
reported in the academic literature.78 Delays in the criminal process then exacerbate these initial 
injuries. Indeed, a “common problem in the prosecution of crimes against victims is that the trial 
is typically delayed through scheduling conflicts, continuances, and other unexpected delays 
throughout the course of the trial.”79 It thus is not surprising that multiple studies suggest “the 
negative effect on a victim’s healing process when there is a prolonged trial of the alleged 
attacker because the actual judicial process is a burden on the victim.”80 And “[t]he long delay 
between reporting a crime to the police and the beginning of the trial represents [a] source of 
psychological stress for crime victims.”81 
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Academic literature confirms the ways in which delays in the criminal justice system 
compound the crime’s initial effects on a victim.82 A victim’s experience with the justice system 
often “means the difference between a healing experience and one that exacerbates the initial 
trauma.”83 For example, one study examining the effect of offender punishment on crime-victim 
recovery found that most victims experienced improved recovery when there was an increased 
perceived punishment of the offender.84  
Delays in proceedings can also be particularly hard on child victims, who have difficulty 
healing until the anxiety of legal proceedings can be brought to an end.85 More broadly, all 
victims have difficulty healing from the trauma of the crime until the trial is over and they can 
turn the page to the next chapter in their lives.86 The harm caused by drawn-out judicial 
proceedings is especially acute in cases involving capital punishment, where the delay between 
the initial sentencing and an execution can stretch for decades.87 Delay in death-penalty cases 
means that “[c]hildren who were infants when their loved ones were murdered are now, as 
adults, still dealing with the complexities of the criminal justice system.”88  
To reduce such suffering, state constitutional provisions now often extend to crime victims 
the right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay. These provisions do not require courts to 
follow victims’ demands for scheduling trial or for ending all delay, but rather to insure against 
“unreasonable” delay.89 In interpreting these provisions, courts can look to the body of case law 
that already exists for resolving defendants’ speedy-trial claims. For example, in Barker v. 
Wingo, the United States Supreme Court set forth various factors that could be used to evaluate a 
defendant’s speedy-trial challenge in the wake of a delay.90 As generally understood today, those 
factors are: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) whether and when the 
defendant asserted his speedy-trial right; and (4) whether the defendant was prejudiced by the 
delay.91 The same sorts of considerations apply to victims and could be evaluated in assessing 
victims’ claim to the need for a speedy resolution. 
 
E. THE RIGHT TO NOTICE OF RELEASE OR ESCAPE OF THE ACCUSED 
Another commonly recognized right concerns protections for victims. Defendants and 
convicted offenders who are released pose a special danger to their victims. An unconvicted 
defendant may threaten or carry out violence to permanently silence the victim and prevent 
subsequent testimony. Or a convicted offender may later attack the victim in a quest for revenge. 
These dangers are particularly pronounced for victims of domestic violence and rape. For 
instance, Colleen McHugh obtained a restraining order against her former boyfriend Eric 
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91 See id. See generally LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 50, § 18.2. 
Boettcher on January 12, 1994.92 Authorities soon placed him in jail for violating that order.93 He 
later posted bail and tracked McHugh to a relative’s apartment, where on January 20, 1994, he 
fatally shot both Colleen McHugh and himself.94 No one had notified McHugh of Boettcher’s 
release from custody.95 
To prevent such travesties, a number of states have enacted constitutional provisions 
requiring notice to crime victims whenever an offender is no longer in custody. California’s 
amendment, for example, gives victims, upon request, the right to be informed of “the scheduled 
release date of the defendant, and the release of or the escape by the defendant from custody.”96 
Other states have comparable requirements.97 These provisions ensure that victims are not 
suddenly surprised to discover that an offender is back on the streets—one of the animating 
concerns for the recent Marsy’s Law efforts.98 Generally, notice is provided in either of two 
circumstances: either a release, which could include a post-arrest release or the post-conviction 
paroling of a defendant or a pardon,99 or an escape. The administrative burdens associated with 
such notification requirements have recently been minimized by technological advances. Many 
states have developed computer-operated programs that can place a telephone call to a 
programmed number when a prisoner is moved from one prison to another or released.100 
 
F. THE RIGHT TO CONSIDERATION OF THE VICTIM’S SAFETY 
Given the safety concerns of a crime victim in a criminal case, a number of states have also 
recognized a right for crime victims to have their safety considered during court proceedings. For 
example, about 15 states extend to victims the constitutional right to be reasonably protected 
from the accused—such as the California constitutional provision extending a right to victims to 
“be reasonably protected from the defendant and persons acting on behalf of the defendant” and 
to “have the safety of the victim and the victim’s family considered in fixing the amount of bail 
and release conditions for the defendant.”101 Virginia extends to victims “[t]he right to protection 
from further harm or reprisal through the imposition of appropriate bail and conditions of 
release.”102 Sometimes such enactments are supplemented by giving victims the right to be free 
from harassment.103 Federal law, too, gives victims “[t]he right to be reasonably protected from 
the accused.”104 
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These provisions are designed to require that a crime victim’s safety be considered by 
courts, parole boards, and other government actors in making discretionary decisions that could 
harm a crime victim.105 For example, in considering whether to release a suspect on bail,106 a 
court following such a provision is required to consider the victim’s safety. This dovetails with 
the earlier-discussed provisions giving victims a right to speak at proceedings involving bail.107 
Once again, it is important to emphasize that nothing in these provisions gives the victim any 
sort of veto over the release of a defendant. To the contrary, the provisions merely establish a 
requirement that due consideration be given to such concerns in the process of determining 
release. 
Part of that consideration will undoubtedly be whether the defendant should be released 
subject to certain conditions. One often-used condition of release is a criminal protective 
order.108 For instance, in many domestic-violence cases, courts may release a suspected offender 
on the condition that he109 refrain from contacting the victim. In many cases, consideration of the 
safety of the victim will lead to courts crafting appropriate no-contact orders and then enforcing 
them through the ordinary judicial processes currently in place. 
 
G. THE RIGHT TO PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND DIGNITY 
Victims also have considerable privacy and dignity interests at stake in criminal 
proceedings.110 Sexual-assault victims, for example, suffer the ultimate invasion of privacy from 
the crime, and run the risk of continued loss of privacy during the criminal justice process.111 A 
criminal justice system should be structured so that it avoids unnecessary invasions of privacy 
and insults to dignity.112 
Recognizing the legitimacy of protecting such victims’ interests, about 20 states extend to 
crime victims protection for their privacy and dignity interests. For example, California promises 
a victim a right “[t]o be treated with fairness and respect for his or her privacy and dignity.”113 
Arizona promises crime victims the right “[t]o be treated with fairness, respect, and dignity … 
throughout the criminal justice process.”114 And Indiana extends to victims “the right to be 
treated with fairness, dignity and respect throughout the criminal justice process.”115 Federal law, 
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too, guarantees crime victims “[t]he right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the 
victim’s dignity and privacy.”116 
The precise scope of these general rights remains to be fully defined. At a minimum, such 
provisions provide constitutional dignity to various other enactments that help protect victim 
privacy. For example, some states have enacted so-called victim-counselor privilege laws, which 
enable victim counselors to maintain the confidentiality of information revealed to them by 
crime victims, subject of course to constitutional disclosure obligations.117 Constitutional 
protection for victims’ privacy may help to ensure that such statutes operate as intended.118  
 
H. THE RIGHT TO RESTITUTION 
Finally, all states have recognized, to some degree, a crime victim’s right to restitution,119 
and about 20 states have added a state constitutional right to restitution. For example, Illinois 
promises to a crime victim simply “[t]he right to restitution.”120 North Carolina extends to a 
crime victim “[t]he right as prescribed by law to receive restitution.”121 The California 
Constitution contains perhaps the most elaborate provision: 
(A) It is the unequivocal intention of the People of the State of California that all 
persons who suffer losses as a result of criminal activity shall have the right to 
seek and secure restitution from the persons convicted of the crimes causing the 
losses they suffer. 
(B) Restitution shall be ordered from the convicted wrongdoer in every case, 
regardless of the sentence or disposition imposed, in which a crime victim suffers 
a loss. 
(C) All monetary payments, monies, and property collected from any person who 
has been ordered to make restitution shall be first applied to pay the amounts 
ordered as restitution to the victim.122 
Congress has also enacted broad restitution provisions in the federal system. In the 
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act,123 Congress required federal courts to enter a restitution 
order in favor of victims for crimes of violence. The law provides that “[n]otwithstanding any 
other provision of law, when sentencing a defendant convicted of [a crime of violence as defined 
elsewhere,] the court shall order … that the defendant make restitution to the victim of the 
offense.”124 In justifying this approach, the Judiciary Committee explained that “the principle of 
restitution is an integral part of virtually every formal system of criminal justice, of every culture 
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and every time.”125 While restitution is critically important, the committee also found that 
restitution orders were only sometimes entered and, in general, “much progress remains to be 
made in the area of victim restitution.”126 Accordingly, restitution was made mandatory for 
crimes of violence in federal cases.  
Questions continue to swirl around the breadth of these restitution provisions. While some 
decisions interpret restitution provisions broadly to ensure that victims have been made whole,127 
other courts appear to be unwilling to give any real content to constitutional protections for a 
victim’s right to restitution.128 And new crimes have posed particularly vexing challenges, such 
as the issues surrounding how to provide full restitution for victims of child-pornography crimes 
when many widely distributed offenders are responsible for the victims’ losses.129 Perhaps the 
best response to these concerns will be legislative enactments clarifying that victims truly do 
deserve full restitution.130 Legislatures have broad discretion to act in this area, because only 
“utterly disproportionate” restitution awards against defendants raise any constitutional 
concerns.131 
Under restitution provisions, courts are often required to enter an order of restitution against 
the convicted offender. However, frequently offenders lack the means to make full restitution 
payments. Accordingly, the courts can establish an appropriate repayment schedule and enforce 
it during the period of time in which the offender is under the court’s jurisdiction.132  
In determining the contours of the victims’ restitution right, well-established bodies of law 
can be examined.133 Moreover, details are often explicated in implementing legislation 
accompanying state amendments. For instance, in determining the compensable losses, an 
implementing statute might rely on the current federal statute, which includes among the 
compensable losses medical and psychiatric services, physical and occupational therapy and 
rehabilitation, lost income, the costs of attending the trial, and in the case of homicide, funeral 
expenses.134 It is important to understand that victims’ interests and defendants’ interests can 
sometimes align on restitution. A defendant who pays restitution may be able to raise a well-
deserved claim for mitigation of other penalties, perhaps gaining a shorter term of imprisonment 
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or perhaps even no imprisonment at all so that he can continue to work and make restitution 
payments to victims.135 
 
III. THE FUTURE OF CRIME VICTIMS’ RIGHTS  
Given the emerging consensus concerning core victims’ rights as reflected in many state 
constitutions as well as in federal law, credible criminal justice reform efforts cannot ignore 
crime victims’ interests. In moving forward, several recommendations for the future suggest 
themselves.136 Perhaps the most basic—but also most important—goals for the future should be 
expanding the coverage of these core rights across the country. As a result of the history 
surrounding the adoption of these amendments, current coverage is incomplete, both with regard 
to the number of states with amendments in place and the breadth and enforceability of these 
amendments.  
Currently, 15 states lack any constitutional protection for crime victims’ rights. The absence 
of a victims’ rights amendment does not appear to be due to lack of support for such rights by 
citizens in those states, but simply the happenstance that the political processes in these states 
have blocked a straight up-or-down vote on these issues. Crime victims’ rights measures are 
generally in place throughout the West, where the initiative process permits direct access to the 
ballot. Most of the states lacking such rights are in the Northeast and Upper Midwest (including 
the populous states of New York, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin), where such direct ballot access 
is not generally possible. Working within existing political structures, efforts should be made to 
bring the number of states with victims’ rights amendments much closer to 50, so that the core 
rights are available to all victims in all states. 
Even within the roughly 35 states where victims’ rights amendments currently exist, much 
work remains to be done. Some of the first states to pass such amendments included only a small 
number of rights in their amendments. Illustrative of such a bare-bones amendment is Florida’s, 
which provides only that victims “are entitled to the right to be informed, to be present, and to be 
heard when relevant, at all crucial stages of criminal proceedings.”137 The failure of Florida’s 
amendment to more fulsomely cover the other core rights discussed in this article appears to be 
due not to some policy decision to exclude those other rights, but simply the fact that the 
amendment was passed nearly 30 years ago when other, more-expansive models were 
unavailable. 
Related to these coverage limitations are implementation problems. Victims’ rights 
advocates have long been concerned that current enactments “frequently fail to provide 
meaningful protection whenever they come into conflict with bureaucratic habit, traditional 
indifference, [or] sheer inertia.”138 As the Justice Department reported in 1997: 
[E]fforts to secure victims’ rights through means other than a constitutional 
amendment have proved less than fully adequate. Victims[’] rights advocates have 
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sought reforms at the State level for the past 20 years and many States have 
responded with State statutes and constitutional provisions that seek to guarantee 
victims’ rights. However, these efforts have failed to fully safeguard victims’ 
rights. These significant State efforts simply are not sufficiently consistent, 
comprehensive, or authoritative to safeguard victims’ rights.139 
While more recent and comprehensive statistics are lacking, the general consensus appears 
to be that victims’ rights “enforcement is wildly uneven.”140 The limited statistics that are 
available present cause for concern. Consider, for example, one of the seemingly simplest rights 
to extend: the right to notice of court hearings. In the federal system, despite the CVRA 
extending a right to notice to crime victims (and the availability of federal resources), many 
victims continue to be unaware of that right. A GAO report, for example, found that 
approximately 25% of the responding federal crime victims were unaware of their right to notice 
of court hearings.141 Even larger percentages of failure to provide required notices were found in 
a survey of (presumably less well-funded) state criminal justice systems.142 Distressingly, the 
same survey found that racial minorities were less likely to be notified than their white 
counterparts.143 
Against this backdrop, it would make sense to push for strengthening of prominence and 
enforcement of crime victims’ provisions throughout the country. The recent efforts to pass 
Marsy’s laws—strong constitutional amendments—in states that are currently lacking fully 
effective victims’ protections should be encouraged. The Marsy’s Law formulations contain clear 
enforcement mechanisms for crime victims, by directly provided standing to pursue judicial 
enforcement144 as well as the right to a prompt trial-court decision and, if necessary, appellate 
review. Such clear provisions—lodged in state constitutions—offer the best short-term 
mechanism for fully vindicating crime victims’ important interests. 
Also important are efforts to provide legal counsel for crime victims. Enforcement of 
victims’ rights often requires legal assistance.145 And yet all too often, crime victims lack the 
guiding hand of counsel as they confront the daunting and often novel legal questions of how to 
protect their interests in criminal proceedings. While Congress’ enactment of the CVRA in 2004 
was accompanied by funding for legal clinics for victims, in recent years that funding has 
dissipated. Efforts should be made to restore that funding. Perhaps Justice Reinvestment 
Initiatives, which attempt to re-channel certain criminal justice expenditures,146 can be tapped as 
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a source of funds. Recent steps by the American military to provide legal counsel for sexual-
assault victims illustrate how such programs to provide legal assistance to victims can be 
effective.147 
It would also be useful to explore ways of expanding participation of victims through 
innovative “restorative justice” models of criminal justice.148 These models can enhance victim 
participation by affirmatively seeking the active participation of crime victims in criminal 
processes.149 Restorative justice approaches bring outside-the-box thinking to ensure that 
victims’ voices are heard.  
Taking the longer view, it is well worth considering whether crime victims’ rights should be 
placed in the United States Constitution. While this brief essay is not the place to explore all of 
the issues surrounding such a step,150 it is worth noting that the idea has attracted bipartisan 
support, including (for example) both Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush.151 Of course, 
the Constitution should never be amended merely to achieve short-term, partisan, or purely 
policy objectives. But a federal Victims’ Rights Amendment would protect the basic rights of 
crime victims not to be victimized again through the process by which government officials 
prosecute, punish, and release accused or convicted offenders. These are the very kind of rights 
with which our Constitution is typically and properly concerned—the right of individuals to 
participate in all those government processes that strongly affect their lives.152 Perhaps in years 
to come, the experience of the states in amending their constitutions to protect crime victims will 
serve as the basis for crafting a federal amendment that will ensure, once and for all, that these 
important rights are enshrined in and protected by our nation’s fundamental charter. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
To ensure appropriate protection for crime victims in the criminal justice process, the 
following measures are recommended: 
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1. Each state should adopt its own state constitutional amendment protecting core 
crime victims’ rights—such as the Marsy’s Law amendments currently contained in the 
state constitutions of California, Illinois, Montana, North Dakota, and South Dakota. 
2. Each state should ensure that its constitutional and other crime-victim enactments 
are fully enforceable, by giving crime victims standing to enforce their rights and 
appellate review of trial court denials of their rights. 
3. The states and the federal government should find ways to expand legal services for 
crime victims, by increasing funding for crime victims’ legal clinics.  
4. Congress should approve a federal crime victims’ rights amendment and send it to 
the states for ratification. 
 
